This paper introduces ambiguous transfers to study the problem of full surplus extraction and (partial) implementation of efficient allocations. We show that (1) full surplus extraction can be guaranteed via a mechanism with ambiguous transfers if and only if the Beliefs Determine Preferences (BDP) property is satisfied by all agents (2) any efficient allocation rule is implementable via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers if and only if the BDP property is satisfied by all agents. This property holds generically when there are at least two agents. It is weaker than the necessary and sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction and implementation via Bayesian mechanisms. Therefore, ambiguous transfers may provide a solution for situations where Bayesian mechanism design is impossible. In particular, efficient allocations become implementable generically in two-agent problems, which contrasts the impossibility results in the literature.
Introduction
One could perceive ambiguity in many forms of transactions. For instance, Priceline Express Deals offer travelers a fixed price for a hotel stay, but the exact name of the hotel remains unknown until the completion of payment. Another example is the scratch-and-save promotion: a discount rate is determined by the consumer's revealed scratchcard at the time of checkout, and thus the cost of her purchase and even its distribution are mysterious when she decides to buy. As a third example, eBay allows sellers of auction-style listings to set hidden reserve prices. In all the above mechanisms, the allocation or (and) the transfer rule could be considered ambiguous by the agents. We would like to know if such a practice can help the mechanism designer achieve a first-best outcome. This paper introduces ambiguous transfers to study two problems: full surplus extraction and implementation of an efficient allocation rule via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism. In both problems, the mechanism designer informs agents of the exact allocation rule, but the communication is ambiguous so that agents only know a set of potential transfer rules rather than the exact one. Agents are assumed to be ambiguity-averse and thus make decisions based on the worst-case transfer rule.
In this paper, the Beliefs Determine Preferences (BDP) property is the key condition for first-best mechanism design with ambiguous transfers. The property, introduced by Neeman (2004) , requires that an agent with different types should have distinct beliefs. We show that (1) full surplus extraction can be guaranteed via a mechanism with ambiguous transfers if and only if the BDP property holds for all agents (2) any efficient allocation rule is implementable via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers if and only if the BDP property holds for all agents. These two are the primary results of this paper. As an extension, we show any efficient allocation rule under private value environments is implementable via ambiguous transfers if and only if at most one agent does not satisfy the BDP property. Then, we investigate an environment without a common prior and show that the BDP property is sufficient for individually rational and budgetbalanced implementation of an efficient allocation rule under private value environments.
Our key condition, the BDP property, is weaker than Crémer and McLean (1988) 's Convex Independence condition, which is necessary and sufficient for full surplus extraction via a Bayesian mechanism. Convex Independence, together with the Identifiability condition established by Kosenok and Severinov (2008) , is necessary and sufficient for implementing any efficient allocation rule via an individually rational and budget-balanced Bayesian implementation. In a type space with fixed finite dimension and more than one agent, the BDP property holds generically. Without restricting the dimension, models satisfying the BDP property are topologically generic, as is shown by Chen and Xiong (2011) .
We summarize several advantages of the BDP property below. Firstly, compared to Convex Independence, the BDP property imposes weaker restrictions on the cardinality of the type space. For example, in a two agent problem, where one agent has two types and the other has three, Convex Independence never holds, but the BDP property holds generically.
Secondly, the Identifiability conditon is relaxed, and hence so is its associated restriction on cardinality of the type space.
1 For example, in a three-agent problem where each agent has two types, the Identifiability problem fail with positive probability, but the BDP property holds generically. Thirdly, the Bayesian mechanism design literature documents several negative results on individually rational and budget-balanced implementation with two agents, but the BDP property and ambiguous transfers provide a generic solution to such problems.
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In view of the many bilateral trades and bargains occurring every day, two-agent problems are particularly important and fundamental. Fourthly, the BDP property is very easy to check. To verify this property for some agent, we only need to make sure that she never has identical beliefs under different types.
In this paper, we let the mechanism designer announce a fixed efficient allocation rule and introduce ambiguity in transfer rules only. To see why we impose this restriction, notice that the allocation rule in an implementation problem is exogenous, and thus, it is natural for the mechanism designer to commit to that particular allocation rule. When the mechanism designer aims to extract full surplus instead, she endogenously chooses an ex-post efficient allocation rule, which is often unique in a finite-type framework. Hence, we do not give the mechanism designer the freedom to use ambiguous allocation rules in full surplus extraction either. In a related paper, Di Tillio et al. (2017) study how second-best outcomes under independent beliefs could be improved if the mechanism designer introduces ambiguity in both allocation and transfer rules. We discuss more on the relationship with that paper in Section 1.1. As a by-product, the restriction on no ambiguity in allocation rules also helps us to clarify the scope and limitation of ambiguous transfers.
The paper proceeds as follows. We review the literature in Section 1.1 and introduce the environment in Section 2. After providing two examples on how ambiguous transfers work for full surplus extraction and implementation in Section 3, we formalize the mechanism 1 For the first two points, see Section 5 for more details.
2 For example, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) demonstrate the impossibility of efficient bilateral trading with independent information. Matsushima (2007) provides a sufficient condition under which individually rational and budget-balanced implementation with two agents cannot be achieved. Kosenok and Severinov (2008) 's necessary and sufficient conditions never hold simultaneously in two-agent environments, which could also be interpreted as an impossibility result even if correlated information is allowed.
with ambiguous transfers in Section 4. The BDP property is introduced and shown to be necessary and sufficient for full surplus extraction and implementation in Section 5. Section 6 extends our result along several directions. The Appendix collects all proofs and some examples.
1.1 Literature review
Efficient mechanisms with independent information
How to implement efficient allocations is a classical topic in mechanism design theory that has been widely studied in situations such as public good provision and bilateral trading.
Individual rationality is a natural requirement as agents can opt out of the mechanism. As a resource constraint, budget balance requires that agents should finance within themselves for the efficient outcome rather than rely on an outside budget-breaker. When either individual rationality or budget balance is required, the literature provides positive results for efficient mechanism design in private value environments. For instance, the VCG mechanism (Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973) ) is ex-post individually rational. The AGV mechanism (d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) ) is ex-post budget-balanced.
However, the literature documents a tension between efficiency, individual rationality, and budget balance, when agents have independent information. For example, in a private value bilateral trading framework, Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that it is impossible to achieve efficiency with an individually rational and budget-balanced mechanism in general.
With multi-dimensional and interdependent values, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) prove that efficient allocations are generically non-implementable.
The current paper aims to design an efficient, individually rational, and budget-balanced mechanism. But instead of assuming independent information, we show that correlation is necessary and sufficient to achieve the goal.
Mechanism design with correlated information
With correlated information, first-best mechanism design becomes possible. McLean (1985, 1988) establish two conditions to fully extract agents' surplus in private value auctions, among which the Convex Independence condition is necessary and sufficient for Bayesian mechanism design. In a fixed finite dimension type space, if there are at least two agents, and if no agent has more types than all others' type profiles, the condition is satisfied generically. Without restricting the dimension, different notions of genericity are adopted in the literature and various conclusions on genericity of Convex Independence are made (e.g., Neeman (2004) , Heifetz and Neeman (2006) , Barelli (2009 ), Chen and Xiong (2011 , 2013 ). With continuous types, McAfee and Reny (1992) show that approximate full surplus extraction can be achieved by extending Convex Independence. In addition, the recent papers of Liu (2014) and Noda (2015) prove an intertemporal variant of Convex Independence is sufficient for first-best mechanism design in dynamic environments. In
Sections 5.1, by introducing ambiguous transfers, the current paper shows that the weaker BDP property becomes necessary and sufficient for full surplus extraction.
Unlike full surplus extraction, in a problem of (partial) implementation, the allocation rule is exogenously given, and the mechanism designer constructs incentive compatible transfers to achieve the desired outcome. Under the context of exchange economies, Postlewaite (2002, 2003a,b) propose the notion of informational size and prove the existence of incentive compatible and approximately efficient outcomes when agents have small informational size.
3 Under a mechanism design framework, Postlewaite (2004, 2015) implement efficient allocation rules via individually rational mechanisms under the BDP property. In their mechanisms, small outside money is needed even when agents are informationally small. We do not address the issue of informational size, but our mechanism for implementation in Section 5 is exactly efficient, individually rational, and budget-balanced.
A few papers study budget-balanced mechanisms with or without independent information, including Matsushima (1991) , Aoyagi (1998 ), Chung (1999 , d 'Aspremont et al. (2004) , etc. 4 Among these works, d 'Aspremont et al. (2004) propose necessary and sufficient conditions for budget-balanced mechanisms. All these papers do not require individual rationality.
Also, they assume that there are at least three agents. Actually, d 'Aspremont et al. (2004) indicate an impossibility result in implementing efficient allocations via budget-balanced mechanisms with two agents under correlated information. However, we do require individual rationality, and our mechanism with ambiguous transfers works for environments with at least two agents. Matsushima (2007) and Kosenok and Severinov (2008) design individually rational and budget-balanced mechanisms. The latter work proposes the Identifiability condition, which along with the Convex Independence condition, is necessary and sufficient for implementing an ex-ante socially rational allocation rule under any profile of utility functions via an individually rational and budget-balanced Bayesian mechanism. The Identifiability condition is generic with at least three agents and under some restrictions on the dimension of agents'
types, but Convex Independence and Identifiability never hold simultaneously in a two-agent setting. Thus Kosenok and Severinov (2008) imply an impossibility result in efficient, individually rational, and budget-balanced two-agent mechanism design. In our paper, the BDP property is weaker than Convex Independence, and we do not need Identifiability. Moreover, the BDP property holds generically with at least two agents, and thus we make the impossible possible for two-agent implementation problems.
Mechanism design under ambiguity
In the growing literature on mechanism design with ambiguity-averse agents, most of the works assume exogenously that agents hold ambiguous beliefs of others' types. For example, Bose et al. (2006) prove that when agents are more ambiguity-averse than the auctioneer, a full insurance transfer rule is optimal in a private value auction. Bose and Daripa Song (2016) quantifies the amount of ambiguity that is necessary and sometimes sufficient for efficient mechanism design. We do not assume exogenous ambiguity in agents' beliefs, which is the biggest difference between the above papers and our work. Renou (2014) and Di Tillio et al. (2017) contrast the above works in that ambiguity is endogenously engineered by the mechanism designer. Before the allocation stage, Bose and Renou (2014) let the mechanism designer communicate with agents via an ambiguous device, which generates ambiguous beliefs. Their paper characterizes social choice functions that are implementable under this method. Our paper is different from Bose and Renou (2014) , as we do not need multiple beliefs.
Di Tillio et al. (2017) consider the problem of revenue maximization in a private value and independent belief environment. The seller commits to a simple mechanism, i.e., an allocation and transfer rule, but informs agents of a set of simple mechanisms. As all the simple mechanisms generate the same expected revenue (imposed by the Consistency condition), agents do not know the exact rule and thus make decisions based on the worstcase scenario. Compared to the standard Bayesian mechanism, their ambiguous approach yields a higher expected revenue.
In the current paper, ambiguity is engineered in a similar way to Di Tillio et al. (2017) .
However, instead of studying how second best revenue can be improved via ambiguous mechanisms under independent beliefs, the current paper studies when the first-best outcome in surplus extraction or in implementing efficient allocation rules can be achieved without restricting attention to independent beliefs. As we mentioned before, we fix an efficient al- To see that allowing for ambiguity in allocation rules may result in a failure of full surplus extraction or implementation, we consider a finite-type environment where the total surplus is maximized by a unique allocation rule for example. If it is common knowledge that the mechanism designer's objective is to extract full surplus or implement efficient outcomes, any other allocation with lower surplus levels are non-credible to the agents, and thus should not be used in the mechanism. In Di Tillio et al. (2017)'s framework with independent beliefs and finitely many types, ambiguity in allocation rules plays an important role to achieve incentive compatibility, and therefore, full surplus extraction cannot be achieved.
With continuous types, their approach works for full surplus extraction, and thus we focus on environments with finitely many types only.
The essential factor that enables us to achieve the first-best outcome in finite type environment is the correlation in agents' beliefs. In fact, we show correlated beliefs are necessary and sufficient for full surplus extraction and implementing efficient allocation rules. Correlation also results in different constructions of mechanisms between Di Tillio et al. (2017) and the current paper: in the main section of our paper (Section 5.2), we only need two transfer rules, while the number of simple mechanisms in their paper depends on the cardinality of the type space.
Asymmetric information environment
We study the asymmetric information environment given by
where
• I = {1, ..., N } is the finite set of agents; assume N ≥ 2;
• A is the set of feasible outcomes;
• let θ i ∈ Θ i be agent i's type; denote × i∈I Θ i by Θ, × j∈I, j =i Θ j by Θ −i , and × k∈I, k =i,j Θ k by Θ −i,j ; let |Θ i | represent the cardinality of Θ i , where we assume 2 ≤ |Θ i | < ∞;
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• each agent i has a quasi-linear utility function u i (a, θ) + b, where a ∈ A is a feasible outcome, b ∈ R is a monetary transfer, and θ ∈ Θ is the realized type profile;
• p is a probability distribution on Θ, representing agents' common prior; let p(θ i ) and p(θ i , θ j ) represent the marginal distribution of p on θ i and (θ i , θ j ) respectively; when agent i has type θ i , her belief is derived from Bayesian updating p, i.e., others have type profile θ −i ∈ Θ −i with probability p i (θ −i |θ i ); for agent j = i and type θ j we let
The environment E is common knowledge between the mechanism designer and the agents.
We impose the following assumption throughout the paper unless otherwise specified.
Assumption 2.1: For all i, j ∈ I with i = j, and
An allocation rule q : Θ → A is a plan to assign a feasible outcome contingent on agents' realized type profile. An allocation rule q is said to be ex-post efficient if
, θ for all q : Θ → A and θ ∈ Θ.
A motivating example
In this example, we look at a common prior p such that the standard Bayesian mechanism design approach can neither guarantee full surplus extraction nor implementation of an efficient allocation via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism.
However, when the mechanism designer is allowed to be ambiguous about which transfer rule she adopts, we show that both goals can be achieved.
We assume there are two agents and each agent has three types. The common prior p ∈ ∆(Θ) is defined below.
5 The assumption that |Θ i | ≥ 2 for all i is imposed for simplicity of notation. When at least two agents satisfy this cardinality condition, i.e., when at least two agents have private information, all theorems of this paper hold. See Appendix A.2 for more details. 
Implementation
The common prior p satisfies neither the Convex Independence condition nor the Identifiability condition of Kosenok and Severinov (2008) . Therefore, one can follow their approach to construct an profile of utility functions such that an efficient allocation rule is not implementable. Agents 1 and 2 face a feasible set of alternatives A = {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 }. The outcome x 0 gives both agents zero payoffs at all type profiles. The payoffs given by allocation rules x 1 and x 2 are presented below, where the first component denotes agent 1's payoff and the second denotes 2's. We assume 0 < 3a < B.
x 1 θ contradiction that the interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced ambiguous transfersΦ implement q. Then the following inequalities hold:
2 ), summing the two expressions gives 2a ≥ a + B, a contradiction.
Mechanism with ambiguous transfers
In this section, we formalize the mechanism adopted in the motivating example.
Definition 4.1: A mechanism with ambiguous transfers is a triplet M = (M,q,Φ),
andΦ is a set of message-contingent transfer rules with a generic elementφ : M → R n . We call the setΦ ambiguous transfers.
The mechanism designer commits to the allocation ruleq and an arbitrary transfer rulẽ φ ∈Φ. Before reporting messages, agents are informed of the set of transfersΦ and the allocation ruleq, but notφ, the secretly chosen transfer rule. After agents report their messages, the mechanism designer revealsφ. Then allocations and transfers are made according toq andφ.
In this mechanism, agents face both risk and uncertainty. They merely know the distribution of others' private information, which we interpret as the risk. Their limited knowledge on the exact transfer rule leads to a layer of uncertainty. For each transfer rule, agents compute their expected payoffs based on beliefs generated by the common prior. As agents only know a set of potential transfer rulesΦ, following the spirit of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) 's maxmin expected utility (MEU), we assume that agents make decisions based on the worst-case transfer rule.
A strategy of agent i is a mapping σ i : Θ i → M i . Like most mechanism design works with ambiguity aversion (e.g., Wolitzky (2016) , Di Tillio et al. (2017)), we restrict attention to pure strategies. When there is no ambiguity, the restriction is without loss of generality. When there is ambiguity, depending on how the payoff of playing a mixed strategy is formalized, the restriction could be with or without loss of generality. 6 An equilibrium of the mechanism M = (M,q,Φ) is a strategy profile σ = (σ i ) i∈I such that 6 See Wolitzky (2016) for more details.
for all i ∈ I, θ i ∈ Θ i , and
This paper studies two related but different objectives. One is full surplus extraction by a revenue maxmizing mechanism designer, and the other is implementation of an efficient allocation rule via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism.
A mechanism with ambiguous transfers M = (M,q,Φ) extracts full surplus if there exists an equilibrium σ such that
The requirement that every transfer rule achieves the same ex-ante revenue follows from Di Tillio et al. (2017)'s Consistency condition, i.e., any transfer rule with a lower expected revenue is non-credible to buyers and thus should not be included inΦ. To maximize total surplus, the mechanism designer chooses an ex-post efficient allocation ruleq.
A mechanism with ambiguous transfers M = (M,q,Φ) (partially) implements the efficient allocation rule q, if there exists an equilibrium σ such thatq(σ(θ)) = q(θ) for all
If for each agent i ∈ I, we have M i = Θ i , i.e., M = Θ, then M is said to be a direct mechanism. We omit the message space Θ in direct mechanisms. A direct mechansim (q, Φ) satisfies interim incentive compatibility if inf
Lemma 4.1 (on revelation principle) implies that it is without loss of generality to focus on incentive compatible direct mechanisms.
Lemma 4.1: Full surplus extraction can be achieved by a mechanism with ambiguous transfers if and only if there is an incentive compatible direct mechanism with ambiguous transfers (q, Φ) that extracts full surplus. An allocation rule q is implementable via a mechanism with ambiguous transfers if and only if there exists a set of ambiguous transfers Φ such that (q, Φ)
is an incentive compatible direct mechanism with ambiguous transfers.
Throughout this paper, the outside option x 0 is normalized to give all agents zero payoffs at all type profiles. The direct mechanism with ambiguous transfers (q, Φ) satisfies interim individual rationality if for all i ∈ I and θ i ∈ Θ i , inf
For both full surplus extraction and implementation, we impose the restriction that the mechanism is interim individually rational so that agents participate voluntarily.
The direct mechanism with ambiguous transfers (q, Φ) satisfies ex-post budget balance if for all φ ∈ Φ and θ ∈ Θ, i∈I φ i (θ) = 0. For the purpose of implementing an efficient allocation rule q, we also require the mechanism is ex-post budget-balanced so that outside money is not needed to finance the efficient outcome. Budget balance is not required for the problem of full surplus extraction, because the mechanism designer collects the surplus.
Necessary and sufficient condition
Our necessary and sufficient condition, the Beliefs Determine Preferences property, is introduced by Neeman (2004) . It requires that an agent with different types should have distinct beliefs.
Definition 5.1: The Beliefs Determine Preferences (BDP) property holds for agent i if there does not existθ i ,θ i ∈ Θ i withθ i =θ i such that
The following subsections present the necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction and for implementation of an efficient allocation under any utility functions. The BDP property plays the key role in both results.
Full surplus extraction
Theorem 5.1: Given a common prior p, full surplus extraction can be achieved via an interim individually rational mechanism with ambiguous transfers under any profile of utility functions if and only if the BDP property holds for all agents.
In the Appendix, the proof starts with converting the original problem into finding incentive compatible ambiguous transfers such that every interim individual rationality constraint binds.
The necessity part is proved through constructing utility functions such that full surplus extraction cannot be achieved when the BDP property fails for some agent.
We prove the sufficiency part by constructing a mechanism consisting of two transfer rules. Although there are mechanisms with more transfers that extract full surplus, to be consistent with the spirit of minimal mechanisms as in Di Tillio et al. (2017), we only present the one with two rules. The construction is decomposed into several lemmas, which are useful for both full surplus extraction and implementation. Lemma A.1 shows that for each i ∈ I andθ i ,θ i ∈ Θ i satisfyingθ i =θ i , there exists a budget-balanced transfer rule ψθ iθi with zero expected values to all truthfully reporting agents, such that i achieves a negative expected value when she lies fromθ i toθ i . This step is proven via Fredholm's theorem of the alternative. As ψθ iθi only needs to satisfy one incentive compatibility constraint, its existence is guaranteed by the BDP property instead of the stronger Convex Independence condition. Lemmas A.2 and A.3 construct a linear combination of transfer rules {ψθ iθi } i∈I,θ i ,θ i ∈Θ i ,θ i =θ i , denoted by ψ, such that ψ is ex-post budget-balanced, gives all truth-telling agents zero expected values, and gives all misreporting agents non-zero ones. Pick an ex-post efficient allocation rule q and let η i (θ) = −u i (q(θ), θ) for all i ∈ I and θ ∈ Θ. Let the set of ambiguous transfers for agent i be Φ i = {η i + cψ i , η i − cψ i }. As η i transfers agent i's entire surplus to the mechanism designer and ψ i has zero expected value, every interim individual rationality constraint binds. As ψ i has non-zero expected value whenever i misreports, with a sufficiently large c, the worse expected utility derived from η i + cψ i and η i − cψ i is negative.
Thus, incentive compatibility can be achieved.
We remark that in the construction of ambiguous transfers, budget balance of ψ is more than needed for full surplus extraction. However, requiring budget balance of ψ allows us to use the same lemmas to study both full surplus extraction and implementation. In addition, we achieve ex-post full surplus extraction. Namely, if the mechanism designer wishes to equate the ex-post revenue and ex-post total surplus, our method still works.
When N ≥ 2 and |Θ i | ≥ 2 for all i, our necessary and sufficient condition holds for almost every common prior p ∈ ∆(Θ).
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The necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction under Bayesian mechanism, the Convex Independence condition, requires that for every agent i and type θ i , p i (·|θ i ) is not in the convex hull of {p i (·|θ i )} θ i =θ i . It holds generically when N ≥ 2 and 2 ≤ |Θ i | ≤ |Θ −i | for all i. The BDP property is weaker than Convex Independence in two aspects. Firstly, the BDP property can address some linear cases of correlation that are ruled out by Convex Independence, and secondly, the BDP property holds generically even if one agent has too many types compared to others, but in this case Convex Independence fails for sure. When the BDP property holds for all agents but the Convex Independence fails for someone, mechanisms with ambiguous transfers perform strictly better than Bayesian mechanisms in full surplus extraction.
7 If agents without private information are included in I (see Appendix A.2), the BDP property holds generically for all agents if there exists i, j ∈ I with i = j such that |Θ i |, |Θ j | ≥ 2.
Implementation
Theorem 5.2: Given a common prior p, an ex-post efficient allocation rule q is implementable via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers under any profile of utility functions if and only if the BDP property holds for all agents.
When the BDP property fails, we construct utility functions such that an efficient allocation rule is not implementable. We thus prove the necessity part of this theorem. For the sufficiency part, recall that we constructed budget-balanced transfer rule ψ that gives all truth-telling agents zero expected values and all misreporting agents non-zero ones. Pick any ex-post budget-balanced and interim individually rational transfer rule η. Let the set of ambiguous transfers be Φ = {η + cψ, η − cψ}. Incentive compatibility can be achieved by choosing a sufficiently large c.
We remark that efficiency of q does not play a role in the proof. Actually, by combinating our proof with that of Kosenok and Severinov (2008) , Theorem 5.2 can be extended to implement any ex-ante socially rational allocation rule q, i.e., q satisfying θ∈Θ i∈I u i q(θ), θ p(θ) ≥ 0 rather than just efficient ones. Kosenok and Severinov (2008) prove that the conditions of Convex Independence and Identifiability are necessary and sufficient for implementing all efficient or all ex-ante socially rational allocation rules via interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced Bayesian mechanisms. The Identifiability condition is generic when N = 3 and there exists i ∈ I such that |Θ i | ≥ 3 or N > 3. In a budget balanced Bayesian mechanism without Identifiability condition, some agent i may have the incentive to misreport in a way that makes the truthful report of some j = i appear untruthful because by budget balance i can benefit from j's negative expected transfer. However, when the set of ambiguous transfers Φ is used, i does not have such an incentive, because i is ambiguous about whether misreport of j would result in a positive expected transfer to j or a negative expected transfer. Hence, with ambiguous transfers, we can relax the Identifiability condition.
As the BDP property is weaker than the Convex Independence condition, our ambiguous transfers require a weaker condition than Bayesian mechanisms. The difference between our condition and that of Kosenok and Severinov (2008) characterizes when ambiguous transfers perform strictly better than Bayesian mechanisms in implementation of all efficient or ex-ante socially rational allocation rules. In particular, as Convex Independence and Identifiability never hold simultaneously in two-agent settings but the BDP property holds generically, ambiguous transfers provide a solution for the generic impossibility of two-agent individually rational, budget-balanced and efficient mechanism design.
Extension

Implementation under private value environments
When proving the necessity part of Theorem 5.2, we construct a profile of interdependent value utility functions. Some may wonder if the BDP property is necessary for implementation under private value environments. We will show at least N − 1 agents satisfying the BDP property is necessary and sufficient for ex-post efficient, interim individually rational, and ex-post budget-balanced implementation under all private value utility functions. We will also demonstrate that the condition is strictly weaker than the one needed for Bayesian implementation under private value environments.
A utility function u i is said to have private value if u i a,
Theorem 6.1: Given a common prior p, an ex-post efficient allocation rule q is implementable via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers under any profile of private value utility functions if and only if the BDP property holds for at least N − 1 agents.
We prove the necessity part by construction again, but the utility functions have private values. For the sufficiency part, we first construct transfers such that N − 1 agents are incentive compatible. Then by allocating all the surplus to the remaining agent and aligning her incentives with the mechanism designer, the agent will also report truthfully in the private value environment, i.e., when all agents have private values.
Recall in Theorem 5.2, efficiency of the allocation rule q does not play any role, and thus one can implement inefficient but ex-ante socially rational allocation rules if all agents satisfy the BDP property. However, when only N − 1 agents satisfy the BDP property, efficiency of q plays a role in this proof. This is because we let the agent whose BDP property fails be a budget breaker. Example A.1 in the Appendix illustrates that an inefficient allocation rule may not be implementable via an individually rational and budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers if just N − 1 agents satisfy the BDP property.
To compare ambiguous transfers with Bayesian mechanisms, we present the following necessary condition for Bayesian implementation under private value environments.
Proposition 6.1: Given a common prior p, if any ex-post efficient allocation rule q is im-plementable via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced Bayesian mechanism under any profile of private value utility functions, then the Convex Independence condition holds for at least N − 1 agents.
The necessary and sufficient condition of Theorem 6.1 is strictly weaker than the necessary condition of Proposition 6.1.
8 Hence, ambiguous transfers perform strictly better than Bayesian mechanisms in implementing efficient allocation rules under private value environments.
No common prior
This subsection adopts Aumann (1976) 's agreeing to disagreeing framework to study ambiguous transfers. Namely, we relax the assumption that beliefs are generated by a common prior but still assume that their structure is common knowledge. 9 We provide sufficient conditions under which efficient allocations are implementable via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers. We also demonstrate that ambiguous transfers can perform better than Bayesian mechanisms. In Bayesian mechanism design literature, Bergemann et al. (2012) and Smith (2010) are related to expost efficiency maximization under agreeing to disagreeing framework. Other than allowing for ambiguous transfers, we differ from the former in requiring interim individual rationality and ex-post budget balance and differ from the latter in providing a general condition on when the first-best efficiency is implementable.
In this subsection, p i (·|θ i ) still represents the belief of type-θ i agent i, although the beliefs are not generated by a common prior, i.e., there does not exist p ∈ ∆(Θ) with p(θ i ) > 0 for all θ i ∈ Θ i such that every p i (·|θ i ) is obtained by Bayesian updating p.
Without a common prior among the mechanism designer and all agents, full surplus extraction can still be guaranteed via ambiguous transfers when the BDP property holds for all agents. However, full surplus extraction is no longer equivalent to revenue maximization.
By utilizing the lack of common prior between the mechanism designer and agents, the mechanism designer can arbitrarily increase ex-ante revenue. Therefore, we do not study this problem in this section.
Common prior plays an important role when we prove the Theorems 5.2 and 6.1. In Example 6.1, the BDP property holds for all agents, but without a common prior, an efficient 8 The necessary condition of Proposition 6.1 is not sufficient for Bayesian implementation under private value environments. By strengthening it with the Identifiability condition, we can adapt the argument of Kosenok and Severinov (2008) to give a sufficiency result under private value environments. 9 See Morris (1995) for a review of the justifications of modeling with and without a common prior.
allocation rule is not implementable via ambiguous transfers. 2 ) by 40, 105, 75, 70, and 42 respectively, add them up, and let go to zero, we obtain that 290a ≥ 42B, a contradiction. Therefore, q is not implementable via ambiguous transfers.
Despite the failure of Theorem 5.2 without a common prior, a sufficient condition on when efficient allocations are implementable is still feasible. We start with replacing Assumption 2.1 with the following one throughout this subsection because without a common prior, the notation p(θ i , θ j ) is not well defined.
Assumption 6.1: For each i, j ∈ I, i = j, and
Below we introduce a condition called the No Common Prior* property, which strengthens the assumption that agents' beliefs are not generated by a common prior. For all i = j, θ i , and θ j , we abuse notation by let p j (θ i , ·|θ j ) be the vector p j (θ i , θ −i−j |θ j ) θ −i−j ∈Θ −i−j when N ≥ 3, and be p j (θ i |θ j ) when N = 2. 
for any j = i and θ j .
When there is a common prior over Θ, one can show the NCP* property is equivalent to the BDP property. Without a common prior over Θ, the statement of NCP* property cannot be simplied, but it is very weak. For example, if N ≥ 3 and there are agents i = j and typesθ i =θ i ,θ j =θ j , such that the probability distributions over Θ −i−j satisfy p i (·|θ iθj ) = p j (·|θ iθj ) and p i (·|θ iθj ) = p j (·|θ iθj ), then the NCP* property holds for all i ∈ I.
In Example 6.1, the NCP* property fails for agent 1, as (i,θ i ,θ i ) = (1, θ . The second condition can be written
. By settingĈ = ).
In the following theorem, we show that the BDP and NCP* properties are sufficient for implementation via ambiguous transfers when there is no common prior. Theorem 6.2: Given beliefs p i (·|θ i ) i∈I,θ i ∈Θ i that are not generated by a common prior, if the BDP and NCP* properties hold for all agents, then an ex-post efficient allocation rule q is implementable via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers under any profile of utility functions.
Similar to Theorem 5.2, efficiency of q does not play a role in this proof. We can actually implement any q such that
i ∈ I, θ i ∈ Θ i and some ex-post budget-balanced η.
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Example 6.2 illustrates that ambiguous transfers can implement efficient allocations that are not Bayesian implementable. Hence, there are cases when ambiguous transfers perform strictly better than Bayesian mechanisms. Example 6.2: In this example without a common, the efficient allocation rule q is not Bayesian implementable, but is implementable via ambiguous transfers.
Consider the following beliefs that are not be generated by a common prior: p 1 (θ 2 |θ 1 ) θ from agent 1 to 2 , denoted by φ, that implements q. By multiplying IR(θ . Agent 2 satisfies the NCP* property because each pair (θ 2 ,θ 2 ), the first condition in the NCP* property fails.
In a private value environment without common prior, we have the following characterization for implementation of efficient allocations.
Theorem 6.3: Given beliefs p i (·|θ i ) i∈I,θ i ∈Θ i that are not generated by a common prior, if there do not exist i = j such that the BDP property fails for i and the NCP* property fails for j, then any ex-post efficient allocation rule q is implementable via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers under any profile of private value utility functions.
The corollary below provides a simple sufficient condition to guarantee implementation of efficient allocations under private value environments.
Corollary 6.1: Given beliefs p i (·|θ i ) i∈I,θ i ∈Θ i that are not generated by a common prior, if the BDP property holds for all agents, then any ex-post efficient allocation rule q is implementable via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers under any profile of private value utility functions.
To see there are cases when ambiguous transfers perform strictly better than Bayesian mechanisms, we provide the following example.
Example 6.3: In this example of bilateral trading, the efficient allocation rule q is not Bayesian implementable, but it is implementable via ambiguous transfers.
Agent 1 is the buyer, and 2 is the seller. Outcomes in A = {x 0 , x 1 } are feasible, where x 0 represents no trade. The payoffs of x 1 , trading, for both agents are given below. 2 ) by 4, 10, 1, 10, and 8 respectively, and then add them up. We obtain −0.9 ≥ 0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, q is not Bayesian implementable.
However, from Corollary 6.1, we know q is implementable via ambiguous transfers.
Other ambiguity aversion preferences
To check the robustness of our result, we look at alternative preferences of ambiguity aversion in this subsection. One is the α-maxmin expected utility (α-MEU) as in Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) , and the other is the smooth ambiguity aversion preferences of Klibanoff et al. (2005) . This section shows that the mechanism designer can benefit from generating ambiguity in transfers, even if agents' preferences are not the same as Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) . Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) introduce the α-MEU, which is a generalization of the MEU. Under an environment described in Section 2, a type-θ i agent i with α-maxmin expected utility has the following interim utility level from participating and reporting truthfully when Φ is the set of ambiguous transfers:
where α ∈ [0, 1]. An agent is said to be ambiguity-averse if α > 0.5. All previous sections adopt the MEU preferences, which correspond to the case α = 1.
Theorem 5.2 holds for the α-MEU preferences if α > 0.5. The only difference of the proof lies in the sufficiency part, where we construct transfers in the same way except for choosing c that is no less than max i∈I,θ i ,θ i ∈Θ i , θ i =θ i
Then it is easy to verify incentive compatibility. Also, the sufficiency part of Theorems 5.1 and 6.1 hold under the α-MEU preferences if α > 0.5.
An agent i with smooth ambiguity aversion has a utility function of
where
• for each distribution π ∈ ∆(Φ), π(φ) measures the subjective density that φ is the true transfer rule chosen by the mechanism designer;
• for each distribution µ ∈ ∆(∆(Φ)), µ(π) measures the subjective density that π ∈ ∆(Φ)
is the right density function that the mechanism designer uses to choose the transfer rule;
• v : R → R is a strictly increasing function that characterizes ambiguity attitude, where a strictly concave v implies ambiguity aversion.
With the motivating example, we demonstrate that introducing ambiguous transfers helps to implement the efficient allocation rule q under smooth ambiguity aversion preferences. Let For v sufficiently concave or c sufficiently large, the above expression has a value no more than v(a), implying that truth-telling is incentive compatible. One can verify other incentive compatibility constraints as well.
Conclusion
This paper introduces ambiguous transfers to study full surplus extraction and implementation of an efficient allocation rule via an individually rational and budget-balanced mechanism. We show that the BDP property is necessary and sufficient for both problems, which is weaker than the necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction and implementation via Bayesian mechanisms. The BDP property holds generically when there are at least two agents. In particular, under two-agent settings, the BDP property offers a solution to overcome the negative results on bilateral trading problems generically.
A Appendix
A.1 Proofs and examples
Proof of Lemma 4.1. It is sufficient to prove the "only if " direction.
Suppose a mechanism with ambiguous transfers M = (M,q,Φ) extracts surplus, then there exists an equilibrium σ such that
Define q(θ) =q(σ(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ. For eachφ ∈Φ, define φ : Θ → R n by φ =φ • σ, and denote the collection of all φ by Φ.
Suppose a mechanism with ambiguous transfers M = (M,q,Φ) implements q. Then there exists an equilibrium σ such thatq(σ(θ)) = q(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. For eachφ ∈Φ, define φ : Θ → R n by φ =φ • σ, and denote the collection of all φ by Φ.
For both cases, we prove that the direct mechanism with ambiguous transfers M = (q, Φ)
is incentive compatible. To see this, for all i ∈ I, θ i ,
where the inequality comes from the fact that σ i (θ i ) ∈ M i can be viewed as a message sent by i under a constant strategy. Therefore, truth-telling is an equilibrium of M .
We present three lemmas before proving Theorems 5.1 and 5. 2.
3.
Proof. We start with defining vectors e θ for all θ ∈ Θ and p θ j θ j for all j ∈ I, θ j , θ j ∈ Θ j . Each of the vectors has N × |Θ| dimensions, and each dimension corresponds to an agent and a type profile. For each θ ∈ Θ, let all elements of e θ that correspond to the type profile θ be 1 and everywhere else be 0. For each j ∈ I and θ j , θ j ∈ Θ j , let elements of p θ j θ j that correspond to the agent j and some type profile (θ j , θ −j ) be p j (θ −j |θ j ) for all θ −j ∈ Θ −j .
Everywhere else of p θ j θ j is 0. Sufficiency. Suppose by way of contradiction that there existsθ i ,θ i ∈ Θ i withθ i =θ i , such that no ψθ iθi satisfies the three conditions. By Fredholm's theorem of the alternative, there exist coefficients (a θ j ) j∈I,θ j ∈Θ j and (b θ ) θ∈Θ such that
Fix any agent j = i. All elements of pθ iθi that correspond to agent j are zero. All those corresponding to agent i andθ i are zero, too. Those corresponding to agent i andθ i may not be zero. The three observations, along with expression (2), imply that
By choosing θ i =θ i in expression (3) and cancelling bθ i ,θ j ,θ −i−j in expressions (3) and (4), we have a θ j p j (θ i , θ −i−j |θ j ) = aθ i p i (θ j , θ −i−j |θ i ). Summing across all θ −i−j ∈ Θ −i−j when
11 As an illustration, we look at a two-agent example with Θ being ((θ N ≥ 3 or ignoring any θ −i−j when N = 2 yields a θ j p j (θ i |θ j ) = aθ i p i (θ j |θ i ). From Bayes' rule,
By choosing θ i =θ i in expression (3) and pluging in a θ j derived in the previous paragraph, we know bθ
Pluging bθ
Necessity. Suppose the BDP property fails for agent i, i.e., there existsθ i =θ i such 
x kk λk = 0 for all k ∈ {1, ..., K}.
Proof. We prove the result by induction.
First, let K = 1. Pick an arbitrary λ 1 > 0. As x 11 < 0, the statement holds for 1.
Suppose the statement holds for K−1, where K ≥ 2. Now we consider an arbitrary X K×K with negative diagonal elements. By the supposition for the northwest K − 1 by K − 1 block,
x Kk λk = 0. Let λ K = 0, and thus the statement holds for K.
Case 2. Suppose
x Kk λk = 0 and
x Kk λ k = 0. When is sufficiently close to zero,
x kk λ k = 0 for all k ∈ {1, ..., K − 1}. Therefore, we can replace (λ 1 , ..., λ K−1 ) with (λ 1 , ..., λ K−1 ) and go back to Case 1.
Case 3. Suppose x Kk λk = 0 for allk ∈ {1, ..., K−1}. Let λ K > 0 and
x kk λk x kK for all k ∈ {1, ..., K − 1} with x kK = 0. Then the statement holds for K. Lemma A.3: If the BDP property holds for all agents, then there exists ψ : Θ → R n such that 1.
2.
.., K} be a one to one mapping, which allows us to index the elements of K.
For all k,k ∈ {1, ..., K} (k,k may be equal), where
we define
where each ψθ jθj is defined and proved to exist in Lemma A.1. By the third property of ψθ jθj , we know xkk < 0 for allk ∈ {1, ..., K}.
From Lemma A.2, there exists
This implies that for all (θ
for all i ∈ I. Then ψ satisfies the third requirement of this lemma. The other two requirements are trivial because ψ is a linear combination of transfers satisfying the two equations.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We first claim that an interim individually rational mechanism with ambiguous transfers (q, Φ) extracts full surplus if and only if q is ex-post efficient and
is clear given expression (1). To see the "only if" direction, suppose q is inefficient or there exists i ∈ I, θ i ∈ Θ i , and φ ∈ Φ such that
individual rationality, the fact that q is a common prior, and Assumption 2.1,
and strict inequality holds for at least one of the inequalities, contradicting expression (1).
Subsequently, we prove the necessity of the BDP property for full surplus extraction.
Suppose there exists i ∈ I andθ i ,θ i ∈ Θ withθ i =θ i such that p i (·|θ i ) = p i (·|θ i ) and surplus extraction can be guaranteed. Consider a private value auction environment with one dimensional valuations satisfyingθ i >θ i > θ j for (j, θ j ) = (i,θ i ) and (i,θ i ). Note that full surplus extraction requires i obtain the good. Then the argument in the first paragraph and interim incentive compatibility require that
The above inequality, p i (·|θ i ) = p i (·|θ i ), and the fact thatθ i >θ i imply
which violates individual rationality of type-θ i agent i.
To demonstrate the sufficiency of the BDP property, pick an arbitrary ex-post efficient
where ψ i is defined and proved to exist in Lemma A.3, η i (θ) = u i (q(θ), θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, and c is no less than
Let the set of ambiguous transfers be Φ = × i∈I Φ i . All interim individual rationality constraints bind because −η i extracts agent i's surplus and cψ i has expected value of zero. To check incentive compatibility, notice that the choice of c gives agents non-positive worst-case expected payoffs when they misreport. Hence, Φ = × i∈I Φ i extracts full surplus.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Necessity. Suppose there exists i ∈ I,θ i ,θ i ∈ Θ such that p i (·|θ i ) = p i (·|θ i ). We will establish the existence of a profile of utility functions and an efficient allocation rule q such that q cannot be implemented via an individually rational and budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers.
Consider an adaptation of the utility functions constructed by Kosenok and Severinov (2008) . Let A = {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 }, where all agents' payoffs of consuming the outside option x 0 are zero. The payoffs for agent i and all j = i to consume x 1 and x 2 are given below with 0 < a < B.
The efficient allocation rule is q(θ) = x 2 if θ i =θ i and q(θ) = x 1 elsewhere.
Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers implementing q. Denote the set of transfers by Φ. Then from IC(θ iθi ) and IC(θ iθi ),
Recall that p i (·|θ i ) = p i (·|θ i ). Adding the above two inequalities gives 2a ≥ a + B, a contradiction. Therefore, q is not implementable via an interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers.
Sufficiency. We pick an arbitrary interim individually rational and ex-post budgetbalanced transfer rule η : Θ → R n . According to Lemma A.3, there exists a budget-balanced transfer rule ψ such that for all i ∈ I, truthfully revealing gives i expected values of zero and misreporting gives her non-zero ones.
Pick any c that is no less than max i∈I,θ i ,θ i ∈Θ i , θ i =θ i
where c exists because the denominator is positive. Let M be (Θ, q, {η + cψ, η − cψ}).
Interim individual rationality of M comes from the fact that η is individually rational and that ψ gives all truth-telling agents expected values of zero. For all i ∈ I andθ i ,θ i ∈ Θ i withθ i =θ i , the choice of c indicates that
which further implies interim incentive compatibility of M. Ex-post budget balance of M follows from budget balance of η and ψ. Therefore, M is an individually rational and budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers that implements q.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Necessity. By relabeling the indices, we assume without loss of generality that agent 1 has distinct beliefs under θ Suppose by way of contradiction that an individually rational and budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers, denoted by M = (q, Φ), implements q. By individual rationality, for all i ∈ I and θ i , type-θ i agent i's worst-case expected utility from participation is U θ i ≥ 0. Hence, for all φ ∈ Φ, forall i ∈ I and θ i ∈ Θ i ,
Multiply each of the inequalities by p i (θ i ) and sum across all i and θ i . By ex-post budget balance, the left-hand side of the aggregated inequality is zero and the right-hand side,
is non-positive. From IC(θ 
In view of the assumption that p 1 (·|θ ) and (7) with θ i = θ 1 1 with θ i = θ 2 2 and φ = φ 2 , and letting go to zero, we obtain that
By plugging the above two inequalities into expression (8), we have that (8) is no less than
In the above expression, the coefficients of θ 1 1 and θ
where the strict inequality follows from Assumption 2.1. Let θ 2.
Notice that the third statement is different from the one in Lemma A.3, as agent i in this theorem has identical beliefs under different types.
We construct a mechanism where agent i obtains all the surplus by truthfully reporting.
For all θ ∈ Θ and j ∈ I with j = i, let η j (θ) = −u j (q(θ), θ j ), and
Pick any c that is no less than
Let the set of ambiguous transfers be Φ = {η + cψ, η − cψ}, which is interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced. The choice of η, ψ, and c implies that for any agent j = i with typeθ j , truthfully reporting gives her zero worst-case expected payoff while lying gives her non-positive ones. Therefore, j's incentive compatibility constraints are satisfied.
For type-θ i agent i, the argument below verifies her incentive compatibility constraints:
where the equality comes from the second property of ψ, the first inequality comes from ex-post efficiency of q, and the second inequality comes from the minimization operation.
Therefore, the individually rational and budget-balanced mechanism with ambiguous transfers implements q. 
Similarly, by IR(θ 
We add the above inequalities pairwise and let go to zero. Thus we have U 
Suppose agent 1 owns a unit of private good and all others are potential buyers. For each i ∈ I, let θ i be agent i's private value of trading, where θ
No trade gives all agents zero payoffs. The efficient allocation rule q is that agent 1 should trade with 2 if θ 1 + θ 2 > 0 and not trade otherwise. Subsequently, we will prove that q is not implementable, which proves the necessity of the condition.
Suppose by way of contradiction there exists an individually rational and budget-balanced Bayesian transfer φ that implements q. Then by individual rationality and incentive compatibility, for all i ∈ I,θ i =θ i , the following inequalities hold:
We choose a constant δ > 0 sufficiently large such that
and then denote the left-hand-side term by γ. Now we compute the weighted sum of the above individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints where (1) the weight of Lemma A.4: Given the belief system p i (·|θ i ) i∈I,θ i ∈Θ i , the BDP and NCP* properties hold for agent i if for allθ i ,θ i ∈ Θ i withθ i =θ i , there exists ψθ iθi : Θ → R n such that,
Proof. By Motzkin's theorem of the alternative, the above system has a solution if and only if there do not exist coefficients (b θ ) θ∈Θ and (a θ j ) j∈I,θ j ∈Θ j ≥ 0 such that
To prove this lemma, we will subsequently establish that there are coefficients (b θ ) θ∈Θ and (a θ j ) j∈I,θ j ∈Θ j ≥ 0, such that expression (12) hold if and only if p i (·|θ i ) = p i (·|θ i ) or both conditions in NCP* property are satisfied by (i,θ i ,θ i ).
To prove the "only if " direction, suppose there are coefficients (b θ ) θ∈Θ and (a θ j ) j∈I,θ j ∈Θ j ≥ 0, such that expression (12) holds. Then,
We remark that thoutghout the proof, if N = 2, we ignore any term θ −i−j to avoid introducing additional notation. By canceling bθ i θ j θ −i−j in (13) and (15), we also have aθ i ≥ 0. Canceling bθ i θ j θ −i−j in (13) and (15) yields 0 = aθ
From Assumption 6.1, it must be the case that a θ j = 0 for all j = i and θ j .
By expression (15), last paragraph implies b θ i ,θ j ,θ −i−j = 0 for all θ i , θ j , and θ −i−j . From expression (13), we further know a θ i = 0 for all θ i =θ i .
By canceling bθ
in (14) and (15), we have aθ 
Case 2. Suppose a θ i > 0 for all θ i =θ i . Following the symmetric argument of the previous case, we know aθ i > 1 and a θ j > 0 for all (j, θ j ) = (i,θ i ). Subsequently, we will establish that (i,θ i ,θ i ) satisfies both conditions in the NCP* property so that the property fails.
for all θ ∈ Θ. Then from expressions (13) and (15), we know µ(·|θ j ) = p j (·|θ j ) and µ(θ j ) = a θ j θ ∈Θ bθ > 0 for all (j, θ j ) = (i,θ i ). Hence, the first condition holds in the NCP* property. By canceling bθ i θ j θ −i−j in expressions (14) and (15), we have aθ
j ) for all j = i and θ j , where
. Recall aθ i > 0 and aθ
, the second condition also holds in the NCP* property.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Suppose the BDP and NCP* properties hold for all agents. According to Lemma A.4, for all i ∈ I andθ i ,θ i ∈ Θ i withθ i =θ i , there exists ψθ iθi : Θ → R n , such that the three requirements are satisfied.
Let η be any interim individually rational and ex-post budget-balanced transfer rule.
Define Φ = {η, η + cψθ jθj : j ∈ I,θ j ,θ j ∈ Θ j ,θ j =θ j }, where c is sufficiently large such that for all j ∈ I andθ j ,θ j ∈ Θ j withθ j =θ j , the following term is negative:
[u j (q(θ j , θ −j ), (θ j , θ −j ))−u j (q(θ j , θ −j ), (θ j , θ −j ))+η j (θ j , θ −j )−η j (θ j , θ −j )+cψθ jθj j (θ j , θ −j )]p j (θ −j |θ j ).
For any type-θ i agent i, the inequality below shows that misreportingθ i is not profitable:
where the equality follows from the second and third requirements of Lemma A.4, and the inequality comes from the choice of c. Interim individual rationality and ex-post budget balance follow from corresponding properties of η and each φ ∈ Φ.
Lemma A.5: Given beliefs p i (·|θ i ) i∈I,θ i ∈Θ i that are not generated by a common prior, if the BDP property holds for all agents, then the NCP* property holds for at least N −1 agents. Pick an agent i ∈ I, where {i} = I\I if I\I is a singleton, and i ∈ I is arbitrary if I\I = ∅. As in Theorem 6.1, let η be an interim individually rational and ex-post budgetbalanced transfer rule such that agent i obtains all the surplus. Define Φ = {η}∪{η +cψθ jθj : j ∈ I with j = i,θ j ,θ j ∈ Θ j withθ j =θ j }, where c is sufficiently large such that for all j ∈ I with j = i andθ j ,θ j ∈ Θ j withθ j =θ j , 0 ≥ θ −j ∈Θ −j [u j (q(θ j , θ −j ),θ j ) − u j (q(θ j , θ −j ),θ j ) + cψθ jθj j (θ j , θ −j )]p j (θ −j |θ j ).
For agent j = i with type θ j , truthfully reporting gives her a worst-case expected utility level of zero because her worst transfer rule, η, extracts all her surplus. Thus, j's individual rationality condition binds. The choice of c implies that misreporting cannot give her a positive worst-case expected utility. Therefore, her incentive compatibility condition hold. Case 2. Suppose all agents satisfy the NCP* property. For any j ∈ I, let P j be the partition of Θ j such that p j (·|θ j ) = p j (·|θ j ) if and only if θ j , θ j are in the sameΘ j ∈ P j . For eachΘ j with |Θ j | ≥ 2 and θ j ∈Θ j , define U θ j according to Lemma A.6. For a singletoñ Θ j ∈ P j and {θ j } =Θ j , define U θ j = 0.
We will demonstrate that for each i andθ i =θ i , the following system has a solution φθ iθi . Therefore, for each i,θ i =θ i , the system has a solution φθ iθi . Let the set of ambiguous To see why including agents without private information may be interesting, consider two consumers with unknown values paying for producing a costly public project. In this exampleĨ = {1, 2} and I = {1, 2, 3}, where 3 is interpreted as a producer whose payoff (profit) is the payments of 1 and 2 minus the cost of production. By efficiency and budget balance, two consumers' aggregated utility from the project minus the cost of production should be maximized.
We demonstrate the modification needed for Theorem 6.3 as an example. In Lemma A.4, we replace all I withĨ and all N withÑ . Let η be a transfer rule such that agent i obtains all the surplus of N agents, where {i} =Ĩ\I ifĨ\I is a singleton and i ∈ I can be arbitrary ifĨ\I = ∅. For any j ∈Ĩ with j = i andθ j =θ j , let ψθ jθj k (θ) = 0 for all θ and k ∈ I\Ĩ. Then one can follow Theorem 6.3 to construct ambiguous transfers.
Incentive compatibility of agents inĨ is achieved in the same way as the original proof. We obtain incentive compatibility of all other agents for free as each of them has only one type.
Individual rationality and budget balance follow from the respective properties of η and ψθ jθj for all j ∈Ĩ with j = i andθ j ,θ j ∈ Θ j withθ j =θ j .
